ST公司非经常性损益盈余管理问题研究开题报告

 2021-12-28 21:31:28

全文总字数:9247字

1. 研究目的与意义(文献综述)

(1)目的

2018年,上海证券交易所对于《股票上市规则》再次进行修订,当上市公司连续两年亏损,公司就会被实行退市风险警示,股票简称前就会加以“*st”标识,以区别于其他正常的公司,表明这家公司经营不善,提示投资者防范风险,谨慎投资。如果企业想要撤退退市风险谨慎标志,即“摘帽”,那么就要在被实施该制度的当年扭亏为盈,同时取得证券所得同意,才能够得以“摘帽”。这次制度修订的初衷是好的,是想给上市公司予以警告,让其改善经营,实现盈利。但是仔细想想,对于连续亏损的企业,经营业绩不好不是一朝一夕的事情,所以要在短时间内实现盈利,对于极大多数企业来说是不可能实现的事情。所以为了“保壳”,为了能够在短时间内扭亏为盈,*st公司就会采用对非经常性损益进行盈余管理这种短期有效的方法,来达到成功“摘帽”的目的。

本文旨在利用*st松江利用非经常性损益进行盈余管理的行为,来揭露st公司进行非经常性损益盈余管理的动机、手段以及后果,并希望监管部门、市场以及企业自身能够一起努力,共同采取措施来杜绝这一现象发生。

剩余内容已隐藏,您需要先支付后才能查看该篇文章全部内容!

2. 研究的基本内容与方案

(1)基本内容及目标

第1章 绪论

1.1 研究目的和意义

剩余内容已隐藏,您需要先支付后才能查看该篇文章全部内容!

3. 研究计划与安排

(1)2019.12.13——2019.12.31 查阅资料,初步选题

(2)2020.01.01——2020.03.11 确定选题

(3)2020.01.12——2020.01.19 完成论文提纲

剩余内容已隐藏,您需要先支付后才能查看该篇文章全部内容!

4. 参考文献(12篇以上)

[1]arjan premti,garrett smith. earnings management in the pre-ipo process: biases and predictors[j]. research in international business and finance,2020,52.

摘要:we analyze a sample of 3,293 ipos from 29 countries to investigate the firm, industry, and country characteristics related to earnings management during the ipo process. we find that ipo firms tend to have significantly positive discretionary accruals (dca) both prior to and after the ipo, suggesting that ipo firms tend to engage in pre-ipo earnings management. however, we also find that using a proxy for earnings management in the ipo year may lead to biased conclusions concerning pre-ipo earnings management. firms that are more likely to need access to capital markets in the future (firms with high leverage, and firms backed by a venture capitalist) are less likely to engage in pre-ipo earnings management. firms operating in countries with a superior rule of law are also less likely to engage in earnings management. lastly, we find that firms may engage in pre-ipo earnings management in part to avoid returning to the capital markets to raise more funds (capital market staging). this result is robust to possible endogeneity bias stemming from management self-selection.

[2]yanyan chen,gary gang tian,daifei troy yao. does regulating executive compensation impact insider trading?[j]. pacific-basin finance journal,2019,56.

剩余内容已隐藏,您需要先支付 10元 才能查看该篇文章全部内容!立即支付

课题毕业论文、开题报告、任务书、外文翻译、程序设计、图纸设计等资料可联系客服协助查找。